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Abstract: Monitoring is a central element in the implementation of national REDD+  
and may be essential in providing the data needed to support benefit distribution. We 
discuss the options for benefit sharing systems in terms of technical feasibility and political 
acceptability in respect of equity considerations, and the kind of data that would be  
needed for the different options. We contrast output-based distribution systems, in which 
rewards are distributed according to performance measured in terms of carbon impacts, 
with input-based systems in which performance is measured in term of compliance with 
prescribed REDD+ activities. Output-based systems, which would require regular community 
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carbon inventories to produce Tier 3 data locally, face various challenges particularly for 
the case of assessing avoided deforestation, and they may not be perceived as equitable. 
Input-based systems would require data on activities undertaken rather than change in 
stocks; this information could come from community-acquired data. We also consider how 
community monitored data could support national forest monitoring systems and the 
further development of national REDD+. 
Keywords: benefit sharing; input-based distribution; output based distribution; equity; 
community monitoring; link to national MRV 
 
1. Introduction 
International debate on the design of an international policy for Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) has been going on since 2003. A three-phased 
approach was adopted at the 15th Conferences of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen in 2009. Under such an approach, countries 
would first receive assistance to build up their capacities, then to experiment with strategies to reduce 
deforestation and degradation before moving on to a fully fledged system under which they could expect 
financial rewards tied to performance compared to agreed baselines or reference levels [1–3]. With 
financial support from the UN-REDD programme (UN-REDD+), the Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility (FCPF) and various bilateral donors, a number of countries are well into phase 1 or starting 
phase 2, and the formal adoption of a REDD+ framework by the Parties at COP19 in Warsaw is a 
major step forwards in turning the idea into reality. A major role for communities has been foreseen, 
not only in managing forests, but also in monitoring tasks related to this [4], and there have been  
many projects promoting methods that could be used for community based monitoring (CBM) for 
REDD+ [5,6]. However, with all these positive advances, some of the challenges of implementing  
this complex policy at national and local level are also becoming more evident [7]. As countries  
move from the basic capacity development phase into Phase 2 of REDD+ and start to envisage how 
performance-based activities could be built into national programmes, several important questions 
arise relating to CBM, benefit sharing and how the related data will tie into national REDD+ data systems. 
We start from the position that CBM is likely to be promoted in national REDD+ programmes,  
even though it is not yet clear what form it will take and what data it will provide. While CBM 
protocols could focus on carbon stock changes in community forests, they could also be designed to 
gather data on activities undertaken rather than on results. Either way, the use of CBM may be very 
important in increasing both the accuracy and the transparency of monitoring processes, but the choice 
of data to be included would have direct bearing on the suitability of such monitoring with respect to 
benefit sharing. 
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In this paper, we present and discuss a range of feasible options for benefit distribution systems  
that governments could select from. We use the term “benefit” here to refer to the direct rewards that 
participants within a national REDD+ system would receive in Phase 3 as an inducement, and we 
assume that the main source of these benefits is the finance raised as a result of international trading of 
the carbon credits, whether this is through a fund or a market; these inducements might be transferred 
to the stakeholders in the form of cash or in kind. We do not consider funds relating to preparatory 
phases, e.g., for capacity building, to be “benefits” in this sense, and in this paper we are not 
considering co-benefits (such improved micro-climates, water supply etc.) that may also accrue to 
participating communities. 
An important question is how the financial benefits of future carbon credits and/or other REDD+ 
payments will be distributed within national programmes or initiatives started at the level of  
sub-national jurisdictions, since although UNFCCCC REDD+ was conceived as a scheme to operate at 
the national level, it has been agreed that in some cases, particularly where national governments do 
not have full authority over some jurisdictions, sub-national programmes will be accepted (e.g., 
province or state level REDD+ programmes). For simplicity, we talk in terms of national programmes 
for the purposes of this article [8]. These benefits may be the main incentives for the participation of 
individual stakeholders in REDD+ activities within national programmes; before opting in, potential 
participants will want clarity on what rewards they could expect, and under what conditions they will 
be eligible to receive them. Not only will they need information relating to their own opportunities 
under REDD+, it is clear that at societal level there will be need for transparency and a legitimate 
rationale to justify how the financial benefits from REDD+ are to be distributed between the different 
participants. These might for example be individuals or communities whose territory includes forest 
areas and who might contribute to REDD+ by improving their forest management approach or by 
making changes in other ways (e.g., management of cattle) to reduce pressure on the forest. However, 
given that community monitoring of such REDD+ activities will in many cases accompany these 
activities, the question arises of whether, and how, this will be used in assessing the relative 
contribution of different participants, and therefore whether it could and should be used as a basis for 
the distribution of benefits. A further question concerns how such community monitored data might be 
integrated with the data systems at national level which will be used by countries in reporting to 
UNFCCC on their national achievements relative to reference levels. 
The assumption is often implicitly made that within national programmes the financial benefits  
that accrue from international sources should simply be shared between participating stakeholders 
according to the performance of each participant, calculated in terms of the tons of carbon each 
participant saves, a model which we refer to as an “output-based benefit distribution system”. 
However, although a carbon-performance metric based on output (amount of carbon saved through 
REDD+ activities) may be appropriate for distribution of benefits at the international level [9], there 
are a number of reasons why it is less suitable for the distribution of benefits within countries or 
jurisdictions. There are alternative metrics for distribution of REDD+ benefits that could be considered, 
using subsidies which are tied to performance in terms of inputs and effort, rather than in terms of 
(carbon) outputs. We refer to models of this type as “input-based benefit distribution systems”. The 
distinction between input-based and output-based models is well known in literature on Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES) [10–12], where the terms “action based” and “results-based” are 
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sometimes used [13]. Input-based systems are much more common in PES systems, that is, payments 
are made on a per hectare basis for changes in management which are assumed to bring about 
improvements in the flow of environmental services, rather than for the delivery of the services 
themselves, partly because capacity to observe and measure the environmental services themselves is 
limited [11]. 
The choice between these different types of benefit distribution model needs to be based on careful 
comparison of their implications with regard to three critical characteristics: (a) technical feasibility, 
particularly as regards baselines; (b) political acceptability, particularly as regards equity and who 
could be included as a participant; and (c) data requirements, particularly with regard to data that could 
be gathered by CBM. We start by describing the two models for benefit distribution, including some 
variations on the input-based approach, in Section 2, before going on to compare them in terms of 
these three critical issues in Section 3. In Section 4, we consider whether and how systems of data 
collection to support benefit distribution at the local level might be linked to national systems for 
REDD+ monitoring and Measuring, Reporting and Verification (MRV). Conclusions are summarized 
in Section 5. 
2. The Difference between Output-Based and Input-Based Systems for REDD+ Benefit Distribution 
International REDD+ as proposed under the UNFCCC is in the long run predicated on an  
output-based benefit distribution system in the sense that by Phase 3, countries are to be rewarded on 
the basis of reduced emissions or increased removals of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, as 
assessed using a baseline or reference level. Countries will only be rewarded for carbon savings which 
are additional in terms of this baseline, and they will be rewarded proportionally to the quantities 
involved. As noted above, many observers have assumed that within countries, the same principle 
should hold: benefits should flow to those who participate in reducing the emissions, on the basis  
of their individual achievements in reducing emissions through reduced rates of deforestation  
and/or degradation or though increasing removals of carbon from the atmosphere through forest 
enhancement [14–16]. This follows the idea of market based incentives [3,9] or a “payment by output” 
approach that has come into vogue in various domains of public policy and public management, 
including the environment [17], and this principle will be followed regardless of whether international 
finance for REDD+ comes from a true carbon market based on off-sets, or from a fund. It reflects a 
model of economic incentives in which the underlying assumption is that people will try harder if  
they are rewarded proportionally to their achievements; in terms of UNFCCC policy the underlying 
rationale is that it will lead to the most cost-efficient mitigation of emissions. Interestingly, many 
(though not all) REDD+ type projects which pre-date UNFCCC and national approaches to REDD+ 
and which sell their carbon credits on the Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM) are also rewarded in this 
way; their funds are, as might be expected, directly related to their carbon performance. However,  
in those where credits are issued for reductions in deforestation (rather than for tree planting and other 
forest enhancement activities, which have different characteristics in terms of accounting [18]) the 
internal distribution of benefits among the project participants (say, between the members of 
participating communities at the local level) is not generally carried out according to individual 
performance [19,20]. There are important reasons for this. Firstly, a system in which payment is tied  
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to individual achievement would require a baseline for each and every participant, against which 
performance could be assessed. Secondly, it may in practice be difficult to identify and define who 
should receive the benefits (i.e., which participants have not deforested, but would have done in the 
absence of the REDD+ project). Thirdly, a system based on individual achievement may offend basic 
principles of equity [18]. As we will demonstrate and explain in this paper, exactly the same kinds of 
challenges arise in the distribution of benefits among participants within national level REDD+ 
programmes (say, between different participating rural communities). 
The alternative to the output-based benefit distribution model is one that distributes rewards on the 
basis of effort or input in the implementation of REDD+ activities. As noted above, in most Payment 
for Environmental Services (PES) systems, landowners are offered a flat rate payment per hectare if 
they agree not to deforest, or to carry out a set of prescribed activities for sustainable use which are 
assumed to conserve forest and retain or increase carbon stocks or biodiversity (see for example [21] 
for the case of Mexico; [22] for the case of Costa Rica; and [23] for the case of Ecuador). Though 
called a “payment for environmental services”, in these programmes the payment is in fact a subsidy, 
and it is paid on the assumption that the actions undertaken will have positive effects on the quantity 
and quality of the services. The improvement in the supply of environmental services is not directly 
measured, although payments are usually made after checking that the activities have indeed been 
carried out, to ensure conditionality. However, additionality is not usually assessed; it is clear that in 
many cases payments do not result in additional effects, since many of the participants would not have 
deforested anyway [21,23] (for an extended discussion of the efficiency of payments in this respect 
under PES, see [24,25]). In input-based systems, potential participants are free to decide if it is worth 
their while to participate, based on the size of the incentive offered. Payments may be higher in areas 
with particularly important ecological characteristics (“graded flat rates”), and may be restricted to 
areas which are genuinely under threat of deforestation. This input-based system of distribution of 
benefits relies on calculation of overall carbon achievements of a large area (state or national level), 
the financial value of which form the basis of the fund to be distributed. It is therefore fundamentally 
different from the output-based one which pays each participant on the basis of the direct measurement 
ex-post of carbon achievements. 
A sophisticated variation on the input-based model is payment by opportunity cost, in which the 
level of the reward or benefit is set based on an estimate of what the landowner/community would 
have to sacrifice financially by conserving the forest or managing it in a sustainable way rather than 
deforesting or degrading it for personal economic gain (note that here we are considering opportunity 
costs only in the sense of how these might vary within any one country. It is of course true that the 
opportunity costs of REDD+ vary between countries, an issue that leads to inequalities in the extent to 
which different countries could potentially participate, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.).  
This is based on the idea that implementation costs are not uniform, and that scaling of payments to 
reflect this will enable more people to participate. There are two ways to estimate opportunity costs: 
(1) payment levels could be set centrally for each type of likely land use change in given regions;  
the per hectare rates of payment in areas threatened by avocado or palm oil plantations, for example, 
would be much higher than rates of payment in areas threatened by less profitable commodities such as 
maize; (2) payment levels are fixed through an auction system, in which potential participants bid, 
proposing the level of payment they consider would match their costs; a central organization would 
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then select which bids to accept, i.e., choosing the most cost effective bids on offer. The knowledge 
that selection will be made in this way should encourage potential participants to put in their lowest 
possible bids. Opportunity costs models, particularly the second type, are considered by some 
economists to offer the most efficient form of incentives as in theory at least they should result in 
carbon savings at lowest costs. Many observers of PES however dispute this, noting that opportunity 
costs do not reflect the full costs of the environmental service delivered since they do not include 
transaction costs [26,27]. Transaction costs (for example, the cost of acquiring the necessary data), 
may vary considerably between the different models, as we show below. It has also been noted that 
opportunity costs vary greatly over space and are usually highest for large landowners in areas of 
greatest deforestation threat [24,28,29], which raises the question of social equity in targeting. Borrego 
and Skutsch [30] have shown that the opportunity costs of shifting cultivation vary by a factor  
of 5 within one community, as richer individuals with larger parcels invest more and get much higher 
returns. A policy of paying the poorer members of the community at a lower rate than the richer 
members is not likely to be popular. Moreover, experience indicates that the suppliers of the 
environmental service prefer fixed payments [31]. 
3. Critical Comparison of Output- and Input-Based Benefit Distribution Systems 
In order to make sound choices in the design of a benefit distribution system, the characteristics of 
the different possible systems needs to be considered. Here, we consider three important sets of 
characteristics. We first look at the different technical challenges associated with baselines for  
output- and input-based systems, secondly at their respective political and equity implications, and 
finally at their data requirements, including the cost of gathering the data that would be needed to 
implement them. 
3.1. Technical Considerations 
3.1.1. Baselines for Output-Based Benefit Distribution 
Payment by output requires a baseline against which performance can be assessed; the baseline 
represents “business as usual”, i.e., it is a projection of what the carbon losses from the forest stock 
would have been if no action were to be taken under REDD+. It is usually based on historical trends, 
and it is in essence hypothetical or counterfactual. The national level baseline is called the reference 
emission level or reference level depending on whether or not it includes forest enhancements. Baselines 
can also be set up for smaller areas within a national territory: for example, REDD+ type projects in 
the VCM have baselines which usually cover the project area and a zone surrounding this area, to 
ensure that any local project leakage will be included. Such projects however are usually made up of 
multiple forest owners or forest owning communities. 
We consider first the case of reduction of emissions (from deforestation) for which REDD+ 
activities are stimulated over a given area, and are successful (the case of emissions from degradation 
raises even more challenges, since lack of historical forest inventory data in most countries means that 
it is not possible to construct a baseline for these carbon losses.) At the end of the period during which 
REDD+ activities have been undertaken, it is possible to compare the actual deforestation  
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rate of the whole area against the baseline, but it is very difficult to know which of the many 
individuals/communities would have deforested in the absence of the project, but did not [18]. For 
example, if a region is made up of 100 forest parcels of equal size, and has had a historical 
deforestation rate of 3%, it would, under a business as usual scenario, be expected to lose the 
equivalent of three parcels of forest every year in the future. If as a result of REDD+ activity, the 
rate of loss is reduced to two parcels per year, the region would receive credits equivalent to one 
parcel. The difficulty, however, is to know which of the many parcels that did not deforest in that 
year should receive these credits. As Figure 1 shows, in year 3, there would be 95 parcels that are 
not deforested, but the credits available for distribution are equivalent to the forest stock of only 
one parcel. Since most deforestation is unplanned, it is impossible to know to which of the  
95 owners or communities the credits should be attributed. In practice, this means that it is 
impossible to relate the “avoided deforestation” to individual owners/communities, and thus to 
determine who should be rewarded. 
Figure 1. Example showing the difficulty of identifying who should receive benefits 
relating to the reduction of deforestation within a large geographical area. (a) Year 1: 
Region has 100 intact forest parcels; (b) Year 2: before REDD+ 3 parcels are cleared: rate 
of loss 3%; (c) Year 3: without REDD+ Continuing at 3% loss, 6 parcels would be cleared 
by the following year; (d) Year 3: with REDD+ However, with REDD+, the rate of loss is 





This is a major dilemma facing national REDD+ programmes, in which the intention is to enroll 
communities and landowners as participants. Credits will be calculated at national level, based on 
overall losses and gains against the reference emission level. Many communities will not deforest,  
but it will not be possible to ascertain which ones would have deforested in the absence of REDD+. 
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This difficulty is a direct outcome of the requirement under REDD+ that carbon savings should be 
additional; credits are not issued for all forest that is not deforested, but only for that amount of forest 
that would have been deforested but was not. 
The apparent solution to this problem would be to create a baseline for every individual property, 
showing their individual past deforestation trends and making individual forward predictions for their 
“business as usual” situations. However, apart from the huge transaction costs that would be involved 
in developing so many baselines, there are difficulties in applying deforestation baselines to each and 
every small property, since the temporary clearances associated with cyclical harvesting and certain 
agricultural practices (e.g., shifting cultivation) would average out in time at broader geographical 
scale. Moreover, a benefit distribution system based on individual baselines would risk presenting 
perverse incentives. Those responsible for a parcel which has never been deforested in the past will be 
at a disadvantage compared to those who have considerably deforested their forests in the past, since 
the latter will be able to claim more credits when they start to improve their management [32]. This 
kind of metric is unlikely to be considered legitimate by the general public, as it does not reward those 
who have always maintained their forest well, a point that we will discuss in more detail below in the 
section on political and equity considerations. 
Secondly, we consider the case of increased removals of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere 
through forest enhancement, which is technically different in terms of baselines from reduced 
deforestation and degradation. It presents other possibilities, and could be credited in a different 
manner. For example, if through improved management, the owners or managers of forest parcels are 
able to increase forest cover, or to increase the density of biomass within the existing forest areas, 
these increases in stock can readily be measured on site [5,33] and could therefore, unlike reductions in 
deforestation and degradation, be attributed directly to the owners or managers [18]. For example, in 
the Scolel Té programme in Chiapas, Mexico, which follows the Plan Vivo system and sells credits on 
the voluntary carbon market, farmers are encouraged to increase tree cover in their coffee plantations; 
increases in tree biomass are measured on their fields, and they receive a payment which is directly 
proportional to the increment [34]. The same strategy has been used in a number of projects in 
Tanzania which involve tree planting [35]. This strategy can also work at the community level: in a 
REDD+ pilot project in Nepal, for example, communities are rewarded for increases in stock in the 
communal forests [36], partly on the basis of their performance. This is also the methodology used  
in afforestation and re-forestation projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The 
measurement of increases in stock in these forests does not rely on counterfactual assessments, which 
are inherent in the assessment of avoided deforestation/degradation. Although a baseline will be required 
to check that the forest was not growing of its own accord before the project began (i.e., to satisfy the 
requirement of additionality), such baselines are relatively simple to develop and there is considerable 
experience in this from CDM projects and in the Voluntary Carbon Sector. It might also be possible to 
develop a methodology that uses independent expert judgment. 
3.1.2. Baselines for Input-Based Benefit Distribution 
In benefit distribution systems based on inputs, on the other hand, all landowners participating in 
the REDD+ programme would receive benefits, provided they carry out the prescribed activities and 
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do not deforest, as is the practice in most PES schemes in developing countries and e.g., in Europe  
for the case of some agri-environmental grants. It is also the principle behind most forest certification 
systems [37]. Although a reference emission level would be necessary at national level to gauge the 
overall national achievements in REDD+, no carbon baselines would be needed to measure carbon 
performance of the participants. Instead, benefits could be based on simple flat rate payments, graded 
flat rates, or opportunity costs, as described above. All that would be needed would be some proof that 
participants had complied with the programme requirements. The challenge, however, is that if the 
financial benefits were to be sourced only from the carbon credits, the money would have to be shared 
between a very large number of participants, meaning that each participant would receive a very small 
amount. Alternatively, the money could be used for community infrastructure and facilities; 
nevertheless it would involve small amounts since it would have to be shared between all participants 
in compliance. In the case illustrated in Figure 1, the profits from the carbon credits issued as a result 
of the reduced deforestation equivalent to one holding would have to be shared between all 95 owners 
who had not deforested. It is also clear that paying everyone, every year, when in reality only a few 
would have deforested in any one year, is not very efficient from an economic perspective; this 
strategy has been heavily criticized for example in the case of the programme Bolsa Floresta in  
Brazil [38]. Moreover, there would be no incentive for extra effort in forest management, as everyone 
would get an equal payment for the same minimum set of activities, even if they voluntarily implement 
additional activities. 
Given the technical difficulties with output-based payments related to the impossibility of determining 
who should be paid and the apparent economic “inefficiencies” of input-based systems (which pay a 
large number of people who would not have deforested anyway), plus the fact that input-based systems 
will never be able to generate sufficient funds to pay all participants a significant subsidy, Balderas 
Torres and Skutsch [18] proposed a dual system of payments. In this system, communities/landowners 
could receive input-related payments for participation in a REDD+ programme in connection with 
reductions in deforestation and forest degradation measured at the jurisdictional or national level,  
and financed from the fund derived at national or state level from sale of aggregate credits calculated at 
that level. In addition, they could receive an output payment for any measured increases of stock which 
they could demonstrate on their own property. The input-related payments to each participant would 
necessarily be small, given that the fund would pay out to all participants, not merely those that  
are responsible for additionality. However, the output payments would vary according to real 
achievements, and, as explained above, these are much easier to measure than counterfactual 
reductions in deforestation, and require no real baseline since increments would be physically 
measured at intervals throughout the crediting period; any increases above the starting value would be 
rewarded. This could stimulate the better management of large areas of degraded forest through 
relatively simple means such as restricting off-take to levels which are sustainable. Since claiming 
credits for such growth would require local data, communities could be required to include monitoring 
as part of their management strategy. As we will discuss in Section 3.3, there would of course have to 
be third party checks, or the threat of them, to ensure that growth rates are not exaggerated. 
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3.2. Political and Equity Considerations 
We now turn to the second critical issue: how output- and input-based distribution systems compare 
when considered from the point of view of political acceptability and particularly as regards equity, 
which is a major concern of many REDD+ observers. There have been a number of literature reviews 
around the issue of equity in benefit distribution for REDD+ [39–41] and these demonstrate that the 
vast majority of articles on benefit distribution in REDD+ take the line that the key issues are  
social equity and rights [19,42–46]. This reflects the heavy engagement of NGOs and civil society 
organizations in REDD+, representing in particular the rights of indigenous peoples. 
A recent article [47] makes it clear that “equity” in REDD+ can be interpreted in many different 
ways. It suggests that equity in benefit distribution could be understood as (a) “merit-based”, i.e., 
benefits go only to those who have achieved carbon savings (which would result from what we have 
called “output-based” benefit distribution; systems of this kind may be considered “equitable” because 
those who receive payments are the ones who have “earned” the benefits). Equity may alternatively be 
understood as (b) rights-based, i.e., benefits going (only) to those who have rights over the resources; 
or (c) needs-based, i.e., benefits should be distributed to favor groups that are marginalized and 
vulnerable, as in pro-poor approaches. Needs-based here refers to needs in the general societal sense, 
not to needs as regards e.g., capacity building for REDD+. 
The choice between these different equity principles can be hotly debated on ideological grounds, 
but it is important also to understand the extent to which output- and input-based distribution mechanisms 
can provide for equity in each of these forms [48–50]. Most obviously, communities or landowners 
with a history of good forest conservation will have flat baselines and would therefore not receive 
benefits under a merit or output-based system, because they can hardly improve on what they have 
been doing in the past, a situation which would be considered highly inequitable in most societies, and 
which is quite likely to act as a perverse incentive, as discussed above. An input-based system which 
would reward all those who carry out good practices, whether they started this earlier or as a result of 
the REDD+ project, is therefore likely to be perceived by the general public as much “fairer” [31],  
and should be preferred in this sense. If, however, the system is based on inputs payments which  
vary to reflect opportunity costs, this could easily be perceived as “unfair”, as it raises questions about 
procedural equity in terms of who calculates the appropriate opportunity cost for each participant, and 
how; and it increases the chances of collusion and corrupt practice in this regard. 
A rights-based approach to equity raises problems in that rights over forest are frequently not 
formalized. Tenure or rights would first have to be established, a process that could delay implementation 
of REDD+ for many years. However, even in countries where rights to forest land are legally in the 
hands of clearly defined agrarian communities, as in Mexico, a rights-based approach could be 
controversial, as there are increasing numbers of people within these communities who are not 
formally members of the community and who do not have a vote in community decision making or 
rights to the common property, either because they did not inherit these rights or because they have 
sold them. Many individuals may be excluded from financial benefits if the rights-based principle is 
applied within the communities participating, and this would be a problem, regardless of whether an 
output-based or an input-based distribution system was to be selected. 
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There are, however, other rights issues which are less discussed and which may have different 
outcomes under output- and input-based systems. This arises when we consider that people or 
communities other than those who own forests might have rights to a share of REDD+ benefits. It is 
well known that many of the drivers of deforestation have their origins outside the forests, in particular 
the expansion of agricultural and grazing land, which may be stimulated by population growth,  
in-migration, increases in prices of crops and meat, or increased external demand. It is clear that to 
succeed, REDD+ will have to tackle such drivers directly. A national government might for example 
choose to stimulate agricultural practices that reduce pressure on forests. It would therefore be quite 
reasonable if some of the financial benefits derived from international sales of REDD+ credits or 
carbon funds were to be invested in the promotion of these practices, if it can be shown that this is an 
effective way of conserving forests. The underlying principle here is that it is not only the owners or 
managers of forests who could be eligible for benefits, but also actors outside the forest ([51]; see  
also [52] for the case of agroforestry). There could also be many stakeholders, such as intermediary 
agencies, who might legitimately claim a share of the financial rewards from REDD+, if they are 
implicated in generating participation of forest users, farmers, etc. in REDD+ activities which result in 
decreased emissions or increased sequestration of carbon in forests. The case has also been made that 
part of the financial benefit of REDD+ should be allowed to flow to agricultural research institutes that 
are carrying out research to minimize the impacts of drivers (R. Mathews, p.c). 
It would however be very difficult to make direct quantitative assessments of the impact of any 
such action (whether by a farmer or by a supporting agency) on the rate of reduction of deforestation in 
a given area, with a view to rewarding individuals on the basis of deforestation avoided. It is clear that an 
output-based accounting mechanism would not work here. Some kind of input-based system would be 
needed to establish both the legitimacy of the claims, and the size of the benefits to be assigned to them. 
Finally, there have been many calls for “pro-poor” approaches to REDD+ that approach equity of 
benefit distribution in terms of needs [43,53,54]. The underlying problem here is that in general, it is 
probably not the most marginalized and poverty stricken members of society who are responsible for 
most deforestation or even for degradation. Although the role of poverty in deforestation is contested, 
and evidence is mixed [55–57], if we consider first the problem at the level of the individual, the really 
poor in rural settings are generally laborers working for other farmers, without their own land or cattle, 
or having very small holdings. Those who clear forest for expansion of agriculture need capital, and 
those responsible for large-scale degradation (through logging, forest grazing, etc.) tend to be those 
with more resources at their disposal. It may therefore be difficult to achieve carbon savings by 
directing output-based benefits towards the poorest in society; in fact, it may be a contradiction in 
terms. Apart from the problem that the needs-based approach directs benefits to those individuals who 
are not responsible for deforestation (and may thus be an inefficient strategy in terms of reducing 
emissions), it may also in practice be very difficult to direct benefits to the poorest individuals who 
have no land resources of their own, even in an input-based system, as they may not have the land 
resources to participate at all. 
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If the distribution of benefits happens between communities rather than between individuals, as will 
often be the case in national REDD+ programmes, the question arises of whether poorer communities 
deforest more than richer communities. If this were true, output-based distribution systems would be 
unlikely to reach the poor. One way to overcome these problems at the community level might be to 
design hybrid approaches to achieve equity in benefit sharing. Among the few publications on this, the 
three watershed pilot REDD programmes in Nepal [36] uses a weighting mechanism such that 60% of 
the financial reward is allocated on the basis of needs (using a set of social indicators describing  
each community), 24% on the basis of existing forest stock, and only 16% on the basis of output, 
which is measured as increase in stock in the forest (forest enhancement). In Vietnam, an even more 
complicated weighted index has been developed (the “K” index), which involves both input and output 
indicators [58]. However, both of these innovative approaches are in pilot phase and it is not yet clear 
whether they can be considered successful. 
3.3. Data Considerations 
It is clear that benefit distribution systems crucially depend on data, and this includes not just data 
on carbon fluxes but also data on how REDD+ activities are undertaken and what they consist of. At 
the national level, countries will have to produce robust data on carbon stock changes in order to claim 
carbon credits and bring in the funds necessary to support REDD+ activities. Increasing the accuracy 
and level of confidence of the data; for example, moving from Tier 1 to Tier 3, should in principle 
increase the number of credits that could potentially be claimed. In order to achieve greater data 
certainty, governments may need to monitor change at the local level using local inventories which 
feed into and support the national forest monitoring system. Whether these same data should be used 
as the basis for benefit distribution is, as we have shown, open to question, although it is clear that the 
choice of monitoring and measuring parameters and indicators will inevitably shape and constitute 
what REDD+ will be [59]. Given the important political implications of data, it is crucial to assess 
possible differences in data requirements between input- and output-based systems. 
Output-based benefit systems require very accurate data on carbon outputs at the level of each 
participant, which would necessitate ground level inventories (Tier 3 data). Input-based payment 
systems on the other hand would be associated with regional or national estimates of carbon stock 
change, carried out using remote sensing and Tier 1 or 2 carbon data, and with local information on the 
nature of the activities that are being carried out. The generation of detailed information about 
changing carbon stocks at the local level, which output-based systems would need, is an expensive 
undertaking [60], particularly if carried out by professional staff. Transaction costs of measuring 
carbon stock change at the local level may be reduced if the forest owners or REDD+ actors/implementers 
themselves are involved in this monitoring, but despite the fact that such measurements may be as 
accurate as those carried out by professionals [5,6,61,62], this does not resolve underlying data 
uncertainties. Although the monitoring of changes in forest carbon stocks through measurement of key 
parameters, such as diameter at breast height in a set of permanent sampling plots, is often presented as 
a scientific procedure which can be perfected [59,63], in reality there are significant uncertainties 
involved. Efforts to bring down these uncertainties are inherently costly [64,65], even though in most 
cases only above-ground carbon stocks are measured, ignoring the complexities of the other carbon 
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pools. In addition to measurement errors, the use of tree parameters to calculate carbon stocks relies on 
allometric equations which give, at best, rough approximations, as it is rare to find equations to match 
all the kinds of trees in the sample and default equations are needed. To deal with these kinds of 
uncertainties, conservative estimates are used. This might cause participants to feel cheated, although 
such conservatism is essential to maintain the integrity of the programme. This problem has been 
discussed by Sommerville et al. 2011 [66] for the case of biodiversity, and although the differences 
between carbon and biodiversity assessment are considerable, it is clear that in both cases the cost of 
administering reward or benefit distribution systems based on performance as ascertained through 
local measurements would likely be high, not least because systems which link payments directly to 
outputs in terms of tons of carbon would encourage participants to over-estimate their achievements 
and might even encourage fraud [67,68]. To counteract this, strict regimes of verification would be 
required, with associated costs. This would itself entail the need for a grievances office for participants. 
Basically, any benefit distribution system based on outputs would be costly to administer. On the other 
hand, it would yield very detailed data at the local level that could be a valuable input to national 
carbon accounting, enabling densification of data on carbon stock changes in areas where REDD+ 
activities are being undertaken. 
In contrast, input-based systems only require data verifying that the agreed REDD+ activities have 
been undertaken and maintained successfully, as is the practice in forest certification. The estimates of 
carbon stock change for input-based systems (carried out at the state or national level using remote 
sensing and Tier 1 or 2 data) would inevitably be less secure, and therefore command less confidence 
in international markets, i.e., would result in conservative payments. However, though such systems 
would also necessitate the involvement of some external third party for checks and balances, the 
reporting process would be much easier, cheaper and less burdensome. It would certainly be possible 
to require participants to make regular inventories of their forest-related activities and even their 
carbon stocks as part of their management agreement, even if payments are not based on the change in 
stocks. There would be much less temptation to exaggerate the carbon impacts of the programme if the 
payments were decoupled from these, and thus there would be less need for very careful verification of 
data. An additional benefit would be that since reporting focuses mainly on the activities carried out, it 
would be possible to link activities to changes in carbon stock levels, in other words, to use the data for 
an assessment of the effectiveness of different management strategies, which would be very helpful in 
improving public policy on REDD+. 
A summary of the issues discussed in Section 3, showing the strengths and weakness of output- and 
input-based distribution systems is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Strengths and weaknesses on output- and input-based benefit distribution systems under national REDD+. 
Criteria 
Output-Based Benefit Distributions Systems Input-Based Benefit Distribution Systems 




Simple, parcel-based baselines 
are needed to measure increments 
in forest stocks. It is easy to 
identify which individual or 
communities have increased their 
stocks and base rewards on this 
Not possible to determine 
who deserves avoided 
deforestation credits unless 
individual baselines are 
constructed 
Baselines not required  
Economic efficiency 
Only the additional carbon 
savings will be rewarded 
Construction of individual 
baselines would be very 
costly 
 
All participants receive rewards, even 
those who would not have deforested 
in absence of REDD+. Payments will 




Ability to deliver  
merit-based equity 








Rights to forest are weak in many countries and it is well known that they need to be strengthened if REDD+ is to succeed. In this 








Would not permit actors 
outside the forest to receive 
benefits, as their actions 
cannot be quantitatively 
related to stock changes in 
the forest 
Would permit a division of 
benefits to include actors 
outside the forest 
 




Not likely to benefit poor 
people as in general the 
poor are not the main actors 
behind deforestation 
Could be used to benefit 





Accuracy of data required  
Very high, and needs strict 
verification 
Data requirements low, 
though higher if opportunity 
costs model is used 
 
Transaction costs  High Low  
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4. Relating Data for Benefit Sharing to National Forest Monitoring Systems 
Many national governments are already setting up national forest monitoring systems, which will be 
used among other things to support national measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) of their 
REDD+ activities as required by UNFCCC and international carbon funds. These MRV requirements 
are fixed by UNFCCC and need to be fulfilled by the national monitoring system, which has to capture 
the carbon impacts of the sum of all the REDD+, and other activities over the whole national forest 
area. These national forest monitoring systems will need to include information on drivers of 
deforestation and on the effectiveness of different programmes and policies in dealing with these 
drivers and in reducing emissions. They will be essential in providing feedback to the country on what 
works and what does not work under REDD+, to justify and prioritize REDD+ activities addressing 
key drivers [69,70]. In addition to these international requirements, the national monitoring system 
should cater for the needs of the national REDD+ programme implementation, including benefit 
distribution. A link could be established between data needed to support the benefit distribution 
system, focusing on activities and change in management practice, and data that is already being 
systematized in the national monitoring system. The fact that many REDD+ activities may address 
actions and actors that are outside forests implies that monitoring should include other areas in addition 
to forests [70]. The national system would need to be able to track and monitor REDD+ activities by 
the multiple actors involved both inside and outside the forest and could provide the basis and 
verification for the input-based benefit distribution mechanism. In this way, national forest monitoring 
systems would evolve to underpin and stimulate strategies and priorities for REDD+ implementation, 
to track REDD+ activities and their impacts (both carbon and non-carbon), and to support the 
generation and sharing of benefits for the multiple REDD+ actors involved, as well as providing data 
for reporting on REDD+ performance in terms of greenhouse gas emissions to the international 
community. They could be used to link the success and failure of different types of incentives and 
rewards to the activities undertaken in different parts of the country and, at a broad scale (though not at 
the level of the individual parcel) to achievements in reducing emissions at the national level. 
Moreover, if a dual benefit distribution (i.e., payments based on both outputs and inputs) were to be 
introduced, with output-based payments for increases in stock, there would be locally generated data 
on changing stock levels in the forests, as a result of community biomass stock monitoring. This would 
of course only exist for those parts of the forest where these activities take place, i.e., it would be 
patchy, but it would represent an important source of data, additional to national forest inventories, 
providing information on stock levels which could validate and densify data in the national system. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have argued that a transparent, legitimate and easy to understand benefit 
distribution system will be essential to the success of REDD+ as countries move into Phase 2 and start 
to implement activities at the local level, initially on a pilot scale but with a view to fully-fledged 
performance-based REDD+ in the near future. We argue that there are advantages and disadvantages 
to both output- and input-based benefit distribution systems. Benefit distribution systems based on 
output metrics (calculations relating to reductions of emissions of carbon associated with reductions in 
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deforestation and degradation) are difficult, if not impossible, to implement at the level of individual 
forest parcels, such as forests owned and managed by communities or small landowners, since it is not 
possible to identify who, out of the many land owners who have not deforested in any given time 
period, would have deforested in the absence of REDD+, and thus deserve the rewards (a technical 
problem). In reality, and to ensure public and political acceptability of the programme, all forest 
owners who carry out sustainable forest management practices may need to be rewarded, at least in 
areas where there is a clear risk of deforestation, whether or not they would have engaged in 
unsustainable practices in the absence of REDD+. It is very doubtful that output-based benefit distribution 
systems would be considered equitable by the general public, because this would not reward those who 
have always conserved their forests. Moreover, output-based payments are based on measurements 
which involve considerable uncertainty at the local level, and which involve heavy transaction costs 
and risk of the REDD+ mechanism becoming too complex to be effectively implemented [7]. 
Input-based benefit distribution systems, in which stakeholders receive benefits according to their 
participation in the REDD+ activities such as conservation or sustainable management of forests or 
sustainable agricultural practices, are in many ways preferable to output-based systems. We argue that 
they are technically more feasible, more politically acceptable and easier to administer, with associated 
lower costs, partly because of lower requirements for detailed carbon monitoring. One option is to 
distribute benefits according to opportunity costs, either through a centrally fixed payment level for 
each type of likely land use change (which corresponds with different opportunity costs) or through  
a system of bidding by interested actors. However, though in theory more economically efficient, 
opportunity cost models will involve considerable transaction costs because appropriate payments 
levels would have to be calculated for each participant, and this would raise procedural equity issues 
and increase the potential for corrupt practice. Another option, which is more transparent and simple  
in administrative terms, is that a central agency pays flat rates per hectare in return for good forest 
management or agricultural practice, either using a universal rate or different rates to account for 
varying land use activities, which is in fact the payment method used in most PES schemes including 
some agri-environmental subsidies within the European Union. This, however, would mean that many 
participants would be paid for activities which are not additional in carbon accounting terms, meaning 
that this system will not be very cost-effective. 
As we have shown in this article, both input-based and output-based models have advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of efficiency, legitimacy and political feasibility. We suggest that the best 
solution might be a hybrid system in which stock increases (forest enhancements) are rewarded on an 
output basis at the level of the individual forest parcel, while the financial returns from reductions in 
emissions from deforestation and degradation (assessed at regional level) would be used to fund  
input-based incentives. This would imply that only increases in stock should be rewarded on the basis 
of local measurements of stock change over the REDD+ period (as ascertained by CBM), while 
avoided deforestation and degradation would be monitored at a regional scale. The fund derived from 
sale of the resulting carbon credits could be used to encourage activities both within and outside the 
forest, reaching a broader range of actors; it would therefore not be restricted to forest owners. This 
mixed system would result in a higher level of economic efficiency than a purely input-based system 
because at least the rewards for stock increments would only be paid to those who actually produce 
such increments. 
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Whatever benefit distribution system is chosen, it is important to recognize that if countries wish to 
promote CBM as part of the monitoring for REDD+ as recommended by UNFCCC, they should think 
carefully about what the function of these data will be with regard to the way that benefits are to be 
distributed, and to provide protocols for the CBM that meet these requirements. 
Finally, we suggest that data associated with input-based benefit distribution systems at the local 
level could usefully supplement national monitoring systems, as in addition to carbon data, these will 
require information on the success of different public policies or programmes in reducing emissions.  
In this sense, the requirements for national forest monitoring systems are evolving to more than simply 
accounting for carbon. Data systems are needed to underpin and stimulate strategies and priorities for 
REDD+ implementation, by tracking REDD+ activities and their impacts (both carbon and non-carbon), 
and supporting the generation and sharing of benefits for the multiple REDD+ actors involved,  
in addition to their obligatory role in the reporting of REDD+ performance in terms of green house gas 
emissions to the international community. A dual system of benefit sharing as proposed in this paper 
would certainly require CBM at the local level, which could feed important information both on carbon 
and on the range of interventions undertaken at that level into an improved national data system. 
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